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he modern Internet is a large-scale distributed sys-
tem composed of many complex interoperating
entities: traffic, topology, routing, addressing, and
more. With its continued growth, scalability has become an
increasingly important issue, as has the nature of the com-
plex interactions between these entities. The current Inter-
net architecture suffers from scalability problems in
different respects: growth in traffic, topological size, multi-
homing, and complex interactions across the TCP/IP proto-
col stack are all stressing the current infrastructure. The
evolution of multihoming impacts both the behavior of
traffic and the routing plane. The deployment of IPv6 and
node mobility might also fundamentally change how traffic
and routing behaves in the future. Understanding any of
these aspects requires a thorough study of the relationships
between them. Obviously, we cannot expect to cover in a
single special issue of IEEE Network all aspects of Internet
scalability. In this issue we gather contributions that deal
with routing, naming, attacks against hosts and routers,
and, finally, its topology.
In recent years the exponential growth of the number of
Internet users with increased bandwidth demands has led
to the emergence of the next generation of IP routers. Dis-
tributed architectures are a promising trend, providing
petabit routers with huge switching capacity and high-speed
interfaces. Distributed routers are designed with an optical
switch fabric interconnecting line and control cards. Com-
puting and memory resources are available on both control
and line cards in order to perform routing and forwarding
tasks. These new hardware architectures are not efficiently
utilized by the traditional software models where a single
control card is responsible for all routing and management
operations. The routing table manager (RTM) plays a
highly critical role by managing routing information and, in
particular, a forwarding information table (FIT). In “A
Distributed and Scalable Routing Table Manager for Next
Generation IP Router” Nguyen, Jaumard, and Agarwal
present a distributed architecture set up around a distribut-
ed and scalable RTM that also provides improvements in
robustness and resiliency.
Today’s Internet would be more efficient and robust if
routers could flexibly divide traffic over multiple paths.
Often, having just a few alternate paths is sufficient for
customizing paths for different applications, improving
security, reacting to failures, and balancing load. Yet
alternate paths are often unavailable due to two barriers.
First, in a network the size of the Internet, moving to flex-
ible multipath routing can impose significant computa-
tional and storage overhead on routers. Second, the
independent networks that make up the Internet will not
relinquish control over the flow of traffic without appro-
priate incentives. In “Toward Internet-Wide Multipath
Routing” He and Rexford survey flexible multipath rout-
ing techniques that are both scalable and incentive-com-
patible. Techniques covered include multihoming,
tagging, tunneling, and extensions to existing Internet
routing protocols.
A fundamental building block of the Internet is the nam-
ing system. The Domain Name System (DNS) is the global
lookup service for network resources. To protect DNS
information, the DNS Security Extensions (DNSSEC) have
been developed and deployed on branches of the DNS to
provide authentication and integrity protection using digital
signatures. However, signed DNS nodes have been found
to have an unfortunate side effect: an attacker can query
them as reconnaissance before attacking hosts on a particu-
lar network. There are different ways a zone administrator
can minimize information leakage while still taking advan-
tage of DNSSEC for integrity and source authentication. In
“Minimizing Information Leakage in the DNS” Rose and
Nakassis describe the risk, examine the protocol and opera-
tional options, and look at their advantages and drawbacks.
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While attacks against the DNS can be particularly
disruptive to large numbers of nodes, traffic surges
due to worm attacks are able to partially disrupt rout-
ing. Two of the articles in this issue are related to the
spread of worms and detecting compromised routers.
Through modeling, Debany considers in “Modeling
the  Spread  of  Internet  Worms v ia  Pers i s tent ly
Unpatched Hosts” the effects of Internet worms on
persistently unpatched hosts and hosts for which vul-
nerabi l i t ies  are  re f reshed.  Current  models  have
assumed that all hosts transition through the same set
of states. Debany goes beyond this simplification of
host behavior by allowing hosts to have inherently dif-
ferent characterist ics .  Equil ibrium condit ions are
obtained under which an Internet worm will self-prop-
agate indefinitely, which leads to thresholds below
which worms will become extinct.
While compromising hosts is now very common for
various purposes (e.g., bots, spyware, spam forwarding),
attacks against routers are far less appreciated. The cen-
tral role of routers in end-to-end communication makes
it possible to leverage them for eavesdropping, man-in-
the-middle, and denial-of-service attacks. In response, a
range of specialized anomaly-detection protocols has
been proposed to detect misbehaving packet forwarding
between routers. Mizrak, Mazrullo, and Savage discuss in
“Detecting Compromised Routers via Packet Forwarding
Behavior” the detection of misbehav-
ing packet forwarding between
routers. The article describes a gen-
eral framework for understanding the
available design space and reviews
the capabilities of various detection
protocols.
Last but not least, in “Network
Models with a ‘Soft Hierarchy’: A
Random Graph Construction with
Loglog Scalability” Norros and Reittu
are concerned with the scalability of
topologies in general and Internet-like
topologies in particular. Many graph
models have been proposed to
describe the Internet’s topology at the
IP or autonomous system level, most
of them having power-law node
degrees. The article discusses how a
special class of very simple network
models, random graphs with infinite
variance power law degree, have fea-
tures that may or may not be desirable
from an Internet perspective. The pro-
posed random graphs exhibit loglog
scalability and possess a fascinating
architecture with a softly hierarchical
core network.
Finally, we would like to thank the
Liaison Editor, Professor Kazem
Sohraby, for helping in the final steps
of the reviewing process, as well as the
external reviewers for their valuable
time.
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